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Abstract
In this Article, Professor Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, a renowned scho-
lar in European and Latin-American law, explores flaws in the process by
which members are appointed to the Inter-American Commission and Court
of human rights, respectively. Seeking to strike a balance between “Ideal-
ism” and “Realism,” Burgorgue-Larsen seeks methods for improving the
independence and impartiality of the Commissioners and Judges in the Inter-
American system in the hopes of ultimately lending greater credibility and
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legitimacy to the system as a whole. Drawing comparisons to the appoint-
ment of judges on national and international courts worldwide, Burgorgue-
Larsen ultimately produces specific suggestions for improving the appoint-
ment process, ranging from scrutiny of candidates’ human rights compe-
tencies and language skills to increasing efforts to diversify the candidate
pool, particularly in terms of gender and ethnicity. She concludes by sug-
gesting that greater structural changes, including adjustments to tenure and
appointment procedures, might eventually prove the best solution for ensur-
ing the survival of the Inter-American system.
I Introduction
In the field of human rights—as in politics more generally—Idealism and Re-
alism always trigger a violent pendulum movement.1 If ideals dominate, policy
goals may not be reached; worse, they could be distorted. If only Realism—
even Realpolitik—informs policy development and implementation, it could ap-
pear harmfully cynical and damage normative progress. This Article aims, using
comparative law, to propose some improvements in the appointment process of
members of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights. The
two extremes of Idealism and Realism often appear in the analysis: The former
has helped me to propose some bold (or extreme) ideas; the latter reminded me
that, very often (even in law), the “Best is the enemy of the Good.” At the end of
the day, I have tried, when presenting a few proposals, to strike a happy medium.
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary have always been under
scrutiny.2 Many scholars have tried to identify what ensures the independence
of domestic judges. Since the inception and multiplication of international ju-
dicial bodies,3 scholars have explored this new area of research at the inter-
national level.4 Many factors—institutional, financial, procedural, and legal—
1 The title of this Article is borrowed fromChristian Tomuschat’s book,Human Rights: Between
Idealism and Realism. Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism
(2d ed. 2008). I think these two kinds of extremes (Idealism and Realism) are inherent to scholars’
work on law and, more precisely, about human rights law. It is always difficult to strike a good
balance.
2 Independence and impartiality are not identical concepts. The former refers to the capacity of a
body to resist possible external pressures, to make decisions free from the interference of other kinds
of actors; the latter refers to the ability to make a decision free from any kind of bias. Impartiality
concerns, more precisely, the capacity of a judge during a trial to be as “neutral” as possible. See
the legal definitions in Dictionnaire de droit international public [Dictionary of Public
International Law] 562, 570–72 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001).
3 See, e.g., Société française pour le droit international [French Society of Interna-
tional Law], La juridictionnalisation du droit international [The Jursdictionalization
of International Law] (2003).
4 See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 passim (1997); see also Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, Inter-
national Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J.
271 (2003); Emmanuelle Jouannet, Actualite des questions d’independance et d’impartialité des ju-
ridictions internationales: La consolidation d’un tiers pouvoir international?, in Indéependance et
impartialité des juges internationaux [Independence and Impartiality of International
Judges] 271 (Hèléne Ruiz Fabri & Jean-Marc Sorel eds., 2010); Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Pro-
mote the Independence and Accountability of International Tribunals, 2 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. &
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contribute to ensuring the independence as well as the impartiality of interna-
tional judges. National and international processes to select and nominate can-
didates are among them. With the impressive growth of international judicial
bodies, an extensive legal literature—including reports by independent bodies
like the Institut de droit international5—has constantly pointed out the con-
nection between the procedure of selection and appointment on the one hand
and the independence of the judiciary on the other hand.6 This trend is quite
naturally present within the Inter-American system.7 Good practices in the ap-
pointment processes (both at the national and international levels) are essential
for the public to trust the Inter-American justice system, particularly at times
when it is faced with a very strong crisis of political confidence.8 Ultimately, it
is the crucial and very complex issue of these institutions’ legitimacy that is at
Tribunals 27, 27–62 (2003).
5 See the very interesting Resolution adopted by the 6th Commission during the Rhodes Session
in 2011. Institut de droit international [Institute of International Law], Sixth Commission: The Po-
sition of the International Judge (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/
2011_rhodes_06_en.pdf.
6 It is quite interesting to note that legal literature has started to develop since the interna-
tional judge Charles de Vissher was not re-elected to the ICJ in 1951. See Gilbert Guillaume, De
l’indépendance des membres de la Cour internationale de justice [On the Independence of the Mem-
bers of the International Court of Justice], in 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Amicorum Discipu-
lorumque Liber: Paix, Développment, Démocratie 476 (1998). But it is, above all, the pro-
liferation of international judicial bodies that has been the main incentive to study the political
process of selection and nomination of judges. Bold research directed by Ruth Mackenzie et al.
proves it. Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin & Philippe Sands, Selecting In-
ternational Judges: Principles, Process and Politics (2010). In the same vein, many articles
or collective books demonstrate that the topic is becoming a very important one within the aca-
demic world. See, e.g., Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Nomination et élection des juges à la Cour inter-
nationale de justice [Nomination and Election of Judges to the International Court of Justice], in
Unity and Diversity of International Law 639 (Denis Alland et al. eds., 2014); Jiří Malen-
ovský, L’indépendance des juges internationaux [The Independence of International Judges]
(2011), reprinted in 349 Recueil des Cours de L’Académie de Droit International de laHaye
[Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law] 9 (2011); Anja Seibert-
Fohr, International Judicial Ethics, The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication
757 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2013); Sandra Szurek, La composition des juridictions inter-
nationales permanentes: L’émergence de nouvelles exigences de représentativité [The Composition
of Permanent International Jurisdictions: The Emergence of New Requirements of Representative-
ness], 56 Annuaire Français de Droit International [French Y.B. Int’l L.] (Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique) 41 (2010); Christian Tomuschat, National Representation of Judges
and Legitimacy of International Jurisdictions: Lessons from ICJ to ECJ?, in The Future of the
European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective 183 (Ingolf Pernice et al. eds., 2006).
7 Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, La Independencia e imparcialidad de los miembros de la Comision
y de la Corte [The Independence and Impartiality of the Members of the Commission and of the
Court: Paradoxes and Challenges], in El futuro del sistema Interamericano de los Derechos
Humanos [The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System] 170, 185–91 (Juan E.
Méndez & Francisco Cox eds., 1998); Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, The Independence of the Inter-
American Judge, 11 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 111, 114–26 (2012); Judith Schönsteiner,
Alternative Appointment Procedures for the Commissioners and Judges in the Inter-American Sys-
tem of Human Rights, Rev. IIDH, June–Dec. 2007, at 195, 196 (2007).
8 Douglass Cassel, Regional Human Rights Regime and State Pushback: The Case of the Inter-
American Human Rights System (2011–2013), 33 Hum. Rts. L.J. 1 (2013); see also Dean C. Gross-
man, The Future of the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Introduction, 20 Hum. Rts. Brief
2 (2013).
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stake.9
In this context, my goal in this Article is to try and be as precise and technical
as possible, using comparative law as a tool for making proposals. The purpose
is to find ways to improve the selection and appointment processes of the com-
missioners and judges within the Inter-American human rights system. In Part
II, I will discuss the national processes to select candidates for a post at the Inter-
American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In Part III, I
explore the international processes. I analysis these two issues from a procedural
angle in order to identify—following a comparative approach—the best criteria
to encourage states and the Organization of the American States (OAS) to set up
good practices in terms of judicial governance, as well as from amaterial angle so
as to identify the candidates’ profile, their gender, ethnic origin, etc. In Part IV,
I conclude with remarks concerning the question of tenure and reappointment,
another factor that is closely linked to the question of independence.
II National Processes to Select Candidates
How do we ensure that selection processes are as transparent as possible? How
do we avoid following political interest only or even nepotism? In short, how
do we ensure that only candidates’ professional competences are taken into ac-
count? While these questions are not new,10 appropriate answers have not yet
been found. The issues were considered for a long time as being part of states’
“internal affairs” in the name of the sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty.
However, this principle has been undermined by the increasing need for trans-
parency. Although international law cannot entirely rule out this national aspect
of selection processes, it can nevertheless provide some guidance and even limits.
A Comparative Assessment
Nowadays, at the international level, the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC) provides for strict rules in this respect.11 According to Arti-
cle 36(4):
(a) Nominations of candidates for election to the Court may be
made by any State Party to this Statute, and shall be made ei-
ther:
(i) By the procedure for the nomination of candidates for ap-
pointment to the highest judicial offices in the State in ques-
tion; or
9 Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International
Courts’ Public Authority and its Democratic Justification, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 7 passim (2012).
10 It should be noted that as earlier as the beginning of the twentieth century—when the Per-
manent Court of International Justice was set up—efforts were made to limit states’ discretionary
powers when selecting international judges.
11 It was a way of taking into account the many criticisms of International Criminal Tribunals
membership—International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
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(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candi-
dates for the International Court of Justice in the Statute
of that Court.12
With regard to the regional protection of human rights, no treaty ratified by
member states providing for the procedures to select candidates—to a judge or
a commissioner position—can be found. Nevertheless, international organiza-
tions within which the Inter-American and the European human rights systems
operation (namely the OAS and the Council of Europe) have started to draft
minimal guidelines.
At the European level, several recommendation and resolutions of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) have highlighted crucial
elements to ensure the professional qualifications of judges.13 It must be said
that the arrival of many countries from Eastern Europe, and of judges from
these countries, has caused serious problems in terms of profile and profes-
sional competence of candidates when the Commission disappeared and the
“unique” Court was set up.14 Thus, the Parliamentary Assembly—while often
being strongly opposed to the Committee of Ministers, which considered for a
long time that national procedures fell under national sovereignty—made a point
in providing, over time, a series of basic principles that candidates put forward by
states must respect. The Parliamentary Assembly provided a reminder that in or-
der to ensure the European Court’s efficiency and legitimacy, procedures should
be fair, transparent, and as homogeneous as possible between member states.
It intends to fight two problems affecting national selection procedures, namely
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 36(4), opened for signature July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 109–10 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
13 In Europe, it is the Parliamentary Assembly that pioneered improved standards for the selection
of candidates. In this regard, see Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1646, Nomination of candidates and elections
of judges to the European Court of Human Rights (2009), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/
XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17704; Eur. Parl. Ass. Recommendation 1649, Candidates
for the European Court of Human Rights (2004), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-
Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17193; Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1200, Election of Judges to the European
Court of Human Rights (1999), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.
asp?FileID=16760; Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1082, On the Procedure for Examining Candidatures for
the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights (1996), http://assembly.coe.
int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=16493.
14 This was demonstrated very openly by Professor Jean-François Flauss with no concession
whatsoever to the Council of Europe’s system. That is why he was persona non grata at the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights until his tragic death in 2010. See Jean-François Flauss, Brèves ob-
servations sur le second renouvellement triennal de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [Brief
Observations on the Second Triennial Renewal of the European Court of Human Rights], 61 Revue
Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 5 (2005); Jean-François Flauss, Le renouvellement trien-
nal de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [The Triennial Renewal of the European Court
of Human Rights], 47 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 693 (2001); Jean-François
Flauss, Les élections de juges à la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme (2005–2008) [The Elec-
tion of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights (2005–2008)], 75 Revue Trimestrielle
des droits de l’homme 173 (2008); Jean-François Flauss, Radioscopie de l’élection de la nouvelle
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [Radioscopy of the Election of the New European Court of
Human Rights], 35 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 465 (1998).
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the extreme politicization and the presentation of ill-qualified candidates.15
Resolution No. 1646 (2009) is quite interesting in this regard. The Parlia-
mentary Assembly urges states to comply with the following rules when select-
ing and subsequently nominating candidates to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR):
4.1. issue public and open calls for candidatures;
4.2. when submitting the names of candidates to the Assembly, de-
scribe the manner in which they were selected;
4.3. transmit the names of the candidates to the Assembly in alpha-
betical order;
4.4. candidates should possess an active knowledge of one official
language of the Council of Europe and a passive knowledge of
the other;
4.5. that, if possible, no candidate should be submitted whose elec-
tion might result in the necessity to appoint an ad hoc judge.16
This lobbying by the Parliamentary Assembly was eventually taken seriously
by the CoE’s Committee of Ministers. Apart from the many “sicknesses” re-
vealed by Professor Flauss’s chronicles since the inception of the unique Court,17
following the entry into force of Protocol No. 11,18 the twists and turns taken
to select the last French candidate made all relevant stakeholders realize that it
was time to be firm regarding the level of candidates and to give effect to the
guidelines established by the Parliamentary Assembly.19
In this context, the Committee of Ministers adopted on March 29, 2012,
Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the selection of candidates for the
post of judge at the European Court of Human Rights,20 which should be read
together with the explanatory report.21 This document relating to good prac-
tices is very interesting. Soon afterwards, the Brighton Declaration—where a
high level conference of state parties to the Council of Europe was convened
in April 2012—recalled the importance of the professional quality of judges as
15 Selection procedures that are too diverse do not allow the proposal of “homogeneous” candi-
dates in terms of competence.
16 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1646, supra note 13 (citation omitted).
17 See generally sources cited supra note 14.
18 Flauss, Les élections de juges à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2005–2008), supra
note 14.
19 See infra Section III.A.
20 Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Can-
didates for the Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (Mar. 29, 2012), Doc.
No. CM(2012)40finalE, http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2012)40&Ver=final.
21 Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Can-
didates for the Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights—Explanatory Memoran-
dum (Mar. 29, 2012), Doc. No. CM(2012)40addfinalE, http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=
CM(2012)40&Ver=addfinal.
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directly linked to the “authority and credibility of the Court.”22 States’ prac-
tice is extremely erratic. For a long time, it revealed the executive’s stranglehold
on domestic selection procedures in most instances.23 Nevertheless, increasing
pressure from the Council of Europe’s two main bodies—the Parliamentary As-
sembly first, later joined by the Committee of Ministers—was successful and
encouraged the progressive adoption of “good practices” in various states, even
though there is still a long way to go.
At this stage, it should be said that it is extremely difficult to get a precise
and detailed overview of national selection procedures in Europe. Some states
officially send information regarding their selection procedure to the Parliamen-
tary Assembly, thus making it public and accessible. This is the case with the
Slovak Republic.24 However, this is not the case in a majority of states. In most
of them, the information I gathered was the result of a combination of elements:
access to relevant legal writers’ articles, access to specific reports by the Council
of Europe’s bodies, and in fine conversations with several judges of the European
Court and members of the Registry.25 Difficultly in accessing such information
shows that transparency is far from effective.26
22 Paragraph 21 of the Declaration reads as follows: “The authority and credibility of the Court
depend in large part on the quality of its judges and the judgments they deliver.” High Level
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, ¶ 21
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=BrightonDeclaration. Paragraph 22
details these requirements and expands them to members of the Registry:
The high calibre of judges elected to the Court depends on the quality of the candidates
that are proposed to the Parliamentary Assembly for election. The States Parties’ role
in proposing candidates of the highest possible quality is therefore of fundamental
importance to the continued success of the Court, as is a high-quality Registry, with
lawyers chosen for their legal capability and their knowledge of the law and practice
of States Parties, which provides invaluable support to the judges of the Court.
Id. ¶ 22.
23 Jean-François Flauss thus wrote in 2005 that:
In almost all cases, the national list of candidates has been either introduced, approved
or decided by the Government (Poland, Germany, Croatia, Greece, Malta, Liecht-
enstein, Ireland, Iceland, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Norway), the Head of State (Russia,
Lithuania, Bosnia Herzegovinia), or presented by the State (Portugal, Sweden, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, France), which means that it was the executive authorities of
the country that had a stranglehold over the selection of candidates.
Flauss, Brèves observations sur le second renouvellement triennal de la Cour européenne des droits
de l’homme, supra note 14, at 19 (my translation).
24 Eur. Parl. Ass., Communication of the Sec’y Gen., 3d Part-Sess., Doc. No. 13232 (2013),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=19785 (providing a
thorough presentation of the national selection procedure).
25 These conversations, which took place with several judges and members of the Registry we
are personally acquainted with, especially focused on selection processes over the last few months.
Our main goal was to get as much practical information as possible to draft this Article.
26 We could imagine a periodic report published by the Council of Europe (more particularly the
Parliamentary Assembly), which would be widely publicized and give as precise a picture as possible
of all national selection procedures. Therefore, external monitoring (i.e., by NGOs and academics)
would be strengthened and add to domestic monitoring procedures, provided states handed over
relevant information in good faith.
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Having said that, there are roughly three categories of national selection pro-
cedures according to the Parliamentary Assembly’s criteria:27 the ad hoc proce-
dures derived from any legal basis,28 the procedures established without any le-
gal basis,29 and the procedures based on a formal legal basis.30 I examine below
some domestic examples that highlight each kind of procedure.
The United Kingdom and Luxembourg are representatives of the first type
(the ad hoc procedure). In the United Kingdom, an advertisement for the posi-
tion is put in the national press, with a closing date for written applications the
following month. A month later, a panel meets to select candidates for interview.
The panel interviews potential candidates and recommends three nominees. The
three nominees are approved by U.K. ministers and the list is transmitted to the
CoE by the end of that month. The whole process takes about three months.31
During the election to the Court in 2004,32 the independent Panel was chaired by
Sir Hayden Phillips, Permanent Secretary of the Lord Chancellor’s Department
(Department for Constitutional Affairs) and composed of the Lord President of
the Court of Session (Lord Cullen), the former President of the European Com-
mission’s Advisory Committee of Equal Opportunities (Joanna Foster) and the
principal Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Sir Michael
Wood).
In Luxembourg, the procedure does not rest on any legal basis.33 The va-
cancy is advertised in Mémorial (the official gazette of the Grand Duchy of Lux-
embourg) and, rather than an assessment committee, there is a discretionary
selection by the Council of States, which then hands it over to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. When Dean Spielmann (the actual Presi-
dent of the European Court) was re-elected, no other candidate applied to the
position. An advertisement was aired on the radio to encourage potential candi-
dates. It was a relative failure. Names of civil servants—who were not particu-
larly enthusiastic and who knew that Dean Spielmann was going to be re-elected
anyway—were added to the three name list with the sole purpose of formally
meeting the requirements set up by the Parliamentary Assembly. This example
demonstrates the difficulties faced by a small country when trying to find suitable
candidates.
27 Eur. Parl. Ass., Rep. of the Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, 1st Part-Sess., Doc.
No. 11767, ¶ 17 (2008), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?
FileID=12219.
28 Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Moldova, Norway, Poland, Saint-Marin, Serbia, United Kingdom. We must add that the Brighton
Declaration raises that for Bulgaria, Italy, and Luxembourg, the answers given by the state were not
complete and were an obstacle to a definitive evaluation. See Brighton Declaration, supra note 22.
29 Azerbaijan, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Liecht-
enstein, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.
30 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, the Slovak Republic.
31 Vaughne Miller, Int’l Affairs & Def. Section, SN/IA/5949, The European Court of
Human Rights: The Election of Judges 8 (2011).
32 Flauss, Brèves observations sur le second renouvellement triennal de la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme, supra note 14, at 19–20.
33 The information on Luxembourg came from an interview with a national citizen.
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Belgium and France are typical of the second kind of procedure established
without any legal basis. Belgian judge Françoise Tulkens’ term expired in 2012.
Her replacement was found according to the following informal procedure.34
A call for candidacy was advertised in the Belgian official gazette, in special-
ized publications, in the calendar of the supreme court’s activities, the Bar, and
through academia. Thirteen applicants made themselves known and were later
interviewed by a jury panel composed of six people in charge of selecting the
most suitable candidates. The presence amongst the expert panel of two mem-
bers of the office of the government agent before the European Court was seen
as inappropriate by many observers. This procedure reveals that the government
has kept playing a key role in the process. In the end, the five candidates who had
been short-listed by the jury panel were submitted to the Council of Ministers,
which narrowed the field to three candidates that they presented to the Council
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly with the one woman who had applied not
appearing on the list.
France has a long history in this regard and was not spared of criticism, as we
will later see. Its tradition lies in the “classic rules” about the “national groups”
set up to appoint members to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).35 Ac-
cording to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), such national
groups are responsible for the national selection of candidates. As a matter of
fact, France has expanded its national group’s mandate;36 not only does it partic-
ipate in the selection of candidates to the ICJ, but also to the ECHR and the ICC.
In other words, France has “homogenized” as much as it could the selection pro-
cedure of its candidate to the international judges’ mandates by expanding the
mechanism provided by the Statute of the ICJ—which was also considered “cod-
ified” by Article 36(4)(ii) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.37 This is not a problem
in and of itself. However, although the national group’s membership (members
are appointed by the executive power, more precisely by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs) does not expose any qualification issue (members’ competence is in
no way questionable), it certainly shows obvious and continuous corporatism.
The very fact that lawyers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and members
of the Council of State sit in the French group of the PCA, and generally have
careers in both institutions, demonstrates how confined the system is to those
who have worked at the Quay d’Orsay as diplomats or government agents or
34 Information was obtained thanks to several informal interviews with members of the Court.
35 The constitution of such groups goes back to the Hague International Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, in which Article 44 deals with its membership.
See Szurek, supra note 6, at 41–78.
36 It should be recalled that no national group may nominate more than four persons “of high
moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment
to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.”
Convention for the Protection ofHumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 21(1), Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter The European Convention]. They are elected for a six-year term. It
is quite interesting to note that “[i]n certain countries, national groups play a role in the selection
of candidates to other international courts and tribunals. This practice deserves to be applied more
broadly.” Institut de droit international, supra note 5, art. 1(4) (emphasis added). We can assume
that the French example was prominent in the author’s mind.
37 See Institut de droit international, supra note 5.
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at the Council of State, which is the highest and most prestigious administrative
jurisdiction. In France, things are pretty clear and emblematic of the country’s
culture: Academics are barely represented in the international courts because
they have never been a majority within the “French group” of the PCA. For a
long time, they were not present at all; today they are limited to the “smallest
share.”38 As a consequence, in the whole history of French selection, very few
academics have ever been elected as international judges to the ICJ (only Jules
Basdevant and André Gros were professors in International Law), the ECHR,
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the ICC, or the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The only notable excep-
tion was the French judge to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
This professor, Jean Pierre Cot, was, however, also a political since he was a
former Minister of Cooperation under François Mitterrand.
The Slovak Republic and Romania are countries where the formalization
of the appointment is complete; the former chooses a constitutional basis and
the latter chooses a regulatory basis established by the government. In the Slo-
vak Republic, the 1992 Constitution outlines the selection procedure of can-
didates to international judicial bodies. According to Article 141a(5)(f) of the
Constitution, the Judicial Council has the authority to submit to the govern-
ment proposals of candidates for judges who should act in international judicial
bodies.39 When endorsing the selection of the candidates, the government may
act only upon proposals submitted to it by the Judicial Council. Therefore, it is
a constitutionally-regulated mechanism that leaves an important role to an inde-
pendent body. Nevertheless, the government does not have to follow the Judicial
Council’s advice. In practice, however, it has always done so.
The Judicial Council is the judiciary’s highest body, independent from both
the legislative and the executive powers. This body consists of eighteen mem-
bers, almost all of them being serving judges. When selecting candidates for the
position of the judge at the ECHR, the Judicial Council currently performs its
duties in accordance with national procedure provided for in Section 27g of the
Act 185/2002 Coll. on the Judicial Council as amended (hereinafter the “Act
on Judicial Council”).40 According to the list and curricula vitae of candidates
submitted by the Government of the Slovak Republic for the election of judges
of the ECHR:
Section 27g § 1 [sic] of the Act on Judicial Council stipulates that
38 At the moment, the list, as established in 2013, comprises two former members of the Council
of State who were international judges (Gilbert Guillaume and Jean-Pierre Puissochet) and were
nominated on the CPA’s list several times (the former in 1980 and 2011 and the latter in 1990 and
2010.) The third person is also a member of the Council of State, former Director of Legal Affairs
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Edwige Belliard). Finally, the list also mentions a Professor, Ms.
Geneviève Burdeau, Professor at the Sorbonne Law School (Paris I University), who retired from
academia in September 2014. It is the first time the last two persons have been nominated on the
CPA’s list.
39 Ústava Slovenskej republiky [Constitution] Sept. 3, 1992, Čl. 141a(5)(f) (Slovk.).
40 Zákon o Súdnej rade Slovenskej republiky a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov [Act con-
cerning the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic, and Amending Certain Acts], Zákon č. 185/2002
Z.z., Čl. I, § 27g(1) (Slovk.) (amended 2004).
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the nomination for the election of the candidate for the position of
a judge . . . can be submitted to the Judicial Council by:
a. a member of the Judicial Council;
b. the Minister of Justice of the Slovak Republic;
c. professional organisation of judges;
d. other professional organisation of lawyers.
. . . .
Nomination for a judge who should act . . . in an international judi-
cial body, shall be submitted to the Judicial Council. For the nomina-
tion to be approved it has to obtain a majority of votes of all Judicial
Council members in a secret ballot.41
In Romania, the national selection procedure is ruled by Government Or-
dinance No. 94/1999 on the participation of Romania in the proceedings be-
fore the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe.42 Pursuant to Article 5(1), the nomination of the can-
didates for the position of judge to the Court is made by the government, with
the advisory opinion of the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) following
interviews.43 While there is no detailed selection procedure—be it provided by
primary or secondary legislation—the SCM detailed a selection procedure in
2007 at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The procedure has three
steps.
First, a call for candidacy is published; the announcement is published on
the websites of the SCM together with the model for the CV required by the
Council of Europe,44 the dates given by the Secretary General of the Council of
41 Eur. Parl. Ass., Communication of the Sec’y Gen., 4th Part-Sess., Doc. No. 13612, 3–4 (2013),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=21156.
Requirements for the candidates for the position of the judge of the Slovak Republic in
international judicial bodies are as follows:
a. have acquired legal education by completion of anMA course at the law faculty of
a university in the Slovak Republic, or possess recognised or nostrified document
of law education obtained by completion of studies of the same level at a foreign
university;
b. be of integrity; is probably a credible personality in the field of law and his/her
moral qualities give a guarantee that he/she will duly perform his/her mandate;
c. have permanent residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic;
d. have full legal capacity and health conditions which allow him/her to perform the
judicial mandate;
e. have passed the judicial professional exam, prosecutor’s exam, bar exam or notary
exam and has at least five years of legal practise.
Id.
42 Eur. Parl. Ass., Communication of the Sec’y Gen., 4th Part-Sess., Doc. No. 13305 (2013),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=20068.
43 Id.
44 See infra Section III.A.2.
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Europe, as well as all of the additional documents to be sent to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The announcement is also published in a daily newspaper. The
announcement indicates the requirements stipulated for this position:
[C]andidates shall be of high moral character; possess the qualifica-
tions required for appointment to high judicial office or be juriscon-
sults of recognized competence; have human rights experience; be
proficient in one official language of the Council of Europe (English
or French) and should also possess at least a passive knowledge of
the other.45
Second, the interview of candidates takes place before the SCM Plenary. The
questions cover mostly the experience and mastering of the human rights stan-
dards at the European level, implementation of relevant legislation and knowl-
edge of the ECHR’s case law. Third, the list of candidates is transmitted by the
SCM, following the interviews, to several parliamentary committees for advi-
sory opinion (the legal and the human rights committees of each parliamentary
Chamber) and to the government, which decides on a list of three shortlisted
candidates to forward to the Council of Europe.
Based on these European case studies, what would be appropriate to set up
in the Inter-American system?
B Proposals for the Inter-American System
The Inter-American system has started, though timidly, to try to put pressure on
the OAS member states as shown by the General Assembly Resolution 2166.46
States are encouraged to integrate civil society in the national selection process
of candidates to the Inter-American Commission and Court and to ensure some
transparency with regard to the chosen candidates (notably by publishing their
CVs). However, there are no other detailed guidelines compelling states to har-
monize their national selection procedures.
While it is only the beginning, these first steps should not only be reiterated
but also strengthened for the states to take seriously the obligation to make their
selection procedures transparent. To this end, more detailed resolutions should
be adopted so as to outline good governance criteria.47 It is important that these
criteria are the same for both the Commission and the Court, for they are the
two pillars of the Inter-American system. They should be guided by the same
principles regarding the selection process of their members in order to reinforce
45 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights, 3d Part-Sess.,
Doc. No. 12936 (2012) (for a similar announcement).
46 O.A.S. G.A. Res. 2166 (XXXVI), Public Presentation of Candidates for Membership on the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(June 6, 2006).
47 Would it be suitable for the General Assembly to delegate this task to another OAS body? The
question remains. It would be interesting to see which body’s working are taken most by states and
which proposals are most authoritative. It could be either the Inter-American Juridical Committee
or the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs (CJPA).
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their legitimacy. Therefore, the proposed requirements must be understood as
being applicable to both bodies.
Two leading ideas guide the following proposals: ensuring that the procedure
is objective so as to avoid any kind of politicization, and avoiding all sorts of
“corporatism.”
The first requirement is that the national selection procedure must rest on a
detailed and accessible legal basis. The very existence of a legal basis undeniably
contributes to ensuring a certain degree of predictability, coherence, and trans-
parency in the selection procedure. It is a basic rule of the rule of law—no more,
no less. The public and potential candidates should know the rules of the game
upfront. The nature of the legal basis can vary. Only one European country, the
Slovak Republic, went for a constitutionally-vested rule. In most countries that
have adopted a legal basis,48 it rests on a text from the executive power (Russia,
Romania, and Ukraine) and exceptionally, from the legislature (Slovenia and
Finland). In any case, what is important is that a pre-established legal basis or-
ganizes clearly and precisely the national selection procedure. Much progress
remains to be made in this regard in Europe, and Latin America could lead the
way.
The norms organizing the selection procedure should be made as accessible
as possible. All means of communication and publication should be used: pub-
lication in the Official Gazette, on the websites of the Ministry of Justice and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in national newspapers (and federal states’ newspa-
pers where applicable), in specialized law reviews, on the judicial bodies’ web-
sites (High Courts of justice, judges and bar associations, etc.), on the websites
of Ombudsmen and national human rights commissions, on the websites of uni-
versities and human rights research centers, and on the websites of human rights
NGOs.
The Inter-American Commission and Court could also make information on
national selection procedures accessible online to increase visibility. This would
make it easier for candidates to apply in countries in which they are not citi-
zens. It is all the more important since Article 53(2) of the American Convention
states: “When a slate of three is proposed, at least one of the candidates shall
be a national of a state other than the one proposing the slate.”49 A reasonable
deadline should be given to candidates to allow them to apply: a three-month
period seems adequate.
The second rule requires that the national selection procedure be undertaken
by an independent expert committee. Several questions must be examined: the
method for creating the committee (who sets it up?), its membership rules (who
does it consist of?), its assessment method (how does it make decisions?), and
its decisions’ scope (what decisions does it make?).
The European practice shows that the expert panels have almost all been set
up by the executive, generally under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign
48 As we have seen before, a large majority of states opted for ad hoc procedures. Such procedures
have been set up swiftly in order to answer a pressing need. Therefore, they should clearly be avoided.
49 American Convention onHuman Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, art. 36(2) (entered
into force July 18, 1978) (emphasis added) [hereinafter The American Convention].
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Affairs, but sometimes the Ministry of Justice. Hence, there is no independence,
in the political sense of the term, from the executive power. Practice also demon-
strates that some of these panels have nonetheless managed to function indepen-
dently from the executive power’s influence, thanks to their members (e.g. in the
United Kingdom). That said, an “umbilical cord” with the creating body (the ex-
ecutive power) remains, as well as government representatives on expert panels,
looking suspicious to public opinion and observers (as has been revealed in the
Belgian case). Therefore, the OAS could take a stand in this regard and encour-
age states to give judicial authorities the mandate to set up independent expert
committees. It would be appropriate as the task is about selecting candidates for
judicial posts.
Quite a few Latin American countries have set up a Supreme Council ofMag-
istracy, such as Ecuador, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Venezuela, Paraguay,
Peru, and Argentina. In these countries, the fact that the expert panel would
be established by the Supreme Council of Magistracy would be a guarantee of
independence from the executive power and avoid “politicization” of the pro-
cess. There is no Supreme Council of Magistracy in other countries, such as
Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic,
and Panama. In these countries, supreme courts appoint judges in lower courts.
We could thus imagine that supreme courts would set up the independent expert
committee. In countries where judges are elected by the people (Bolivia), by the
Parliament (Haiti, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica), or by the president of the republic
(Brazil), a particular solution should be found (and ultimately institutionalized)
to avoid the risk of such naturally “politicized” processes having unfortunate
consequences on national selection. The independent expert committee could be
set up by a national bar association or a nationally-recognized university insti-
tution.
One of the keys to the de-politicization of the procedure is to separate the
selection body from the official nominating body. The following analysis of the
committee’s membership aims to avoid all kinds of corporatism. National expert
panels’ membership should be as representative as possible and give room to
various stakeholders who have different statuses and reasons for legitimacy.
Membership of the expert committee is crucial to its independence in order
to avoid any dominance of one professional status over another in the selec-
tion process (as unfortunately demonstrated by the French case study). It should
thus be systematically composed (no matter which authority sets it up) in equal
shares of one representative from the Magistracy, one representative from the
Bar, and one representative from academia. These first three components are
“classical” and necessary. We found them more or less in ad hoc panels set up in
some European countries (see the British and Belgian examples). However, two
other representatives should be added due to distinctive Latin American fea-
tures: one representative from a human rights NGO and a representative from
the institution of the Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman). Regarding the NGO
representative, it is essential given the importance of civil society in Latin Amer-
ican countries, but also in the Anglo-Saxon culture (such countries are, for the
most part, under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission). Moreover,
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NGOs’ role in the Inter-American system is old and permanent. Old, because the
system would have had problems getting started without NGOs, and permanent
because it keeps consolidating thanks to them.50 NGOs support many petitions
and submit many amicus curiae briefs. Besides, the OAS itself has strong ties to
“civil society.”51 Hence, it seems obvious to give it some room in national expert
panels. The last representative might be from the institution of theOmbudsman.
This major institution, which exists in almost all Latin American countries52
(apart from Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States of America), should be
taken into consideration. The national Ombudsman’s presence in expert com-
mittees would be particularly welcome for two reasons: not only because they are
in general very prestigious due to their proven independence,53 but also because
their mandate—focused on mediation and human rights education—makes their
participation in such a committee particularly appropriate. Given the above, I
consider that the expert committee should be comprised of no more than five
persons. Countries in which there is no Ombudsman could appoint four per-
sons or find a similar institution in their legal system (such as the National Hu-
man Rights Commission). Apart from the statutory representativeness of the
expert committee members, the question arises of their representativeness form
a gender and ethnicity perspective. The earlier it is required in the process at
the national selection stage to put forward women and representatives of eth-
nic minorities (persons of African descent, indigenous people), the higher the
chances of a Commission and Court membership reflecting the variety of Amer-
ican societies (both Anglo-Saxon and Latin).54 Therefore, the expert committee
should consist of at least one women and one “ethnic” representative, that is,
two members out of five (provided the expert committee comprises five mem-
50 Viviana Krsticevic, El papel de las ONG en el sistema interamericano de protección de los
derechos humanos: Trámite de los casos ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [The
Role of NGOs in the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: Case Procedure before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], in 1 El Sistema Interamericano de Protección
de los Derechos Humanos en el Umbral del Siglo XXI [The Inter-American System of
Human Rights Protection at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century] 407, 407–36
(2d ed. 2003); Mónica Pinto, NGOs and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Civil
Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies 47–56 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2005);
J. Hugo Rodriguez Brignardello, OEA y participación de la sociedad civil: Entre un modelo para
armar y otra posibilidad perdida [The OAS and Participation of the Civil Society: Enter a Model for
Arming and Another Lost Opportunity], Rev. CEJIL, Dec. 2005, at 27.
51 O.A.S. Permanent Council Res. 759, Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organi-
zations in OAS Activities (Dec. 15, 1999); Hugo de Zela, The OAS and Human Rights: The Role of
Civil Society Organizations, Aportes DPLF, June 2012, at 48, 49–50.
52 Lorena González Volio, The Institution of the Ombudsman: The Latin American Experience,
Rev. IIDH, Jan.–June 2003, at 219; María Teresa Pareja Rosales de Conrad, El Defensor del
pueblo. Un estudio con especial referencia al Ecuador [The Ombudsman: A Study with
Special Reference to Ecuador] 327 (Jan Woischnik ed., 2004).
53 We should recall that Ombudsmen have intervened before the IACHR against their own states.
These interventions undeniably demonstrate their independence.
54 In this respect, the current membership of the Inter-American Court does not reflect the ethnic
diversity of the continent per se. Likewise, the fact that there are no longer any women is an issue
in terms of fairness and representativeness. The fact that there have only been four women in the
whole history of the Court shows a contrario that there is still a long way to go. Things are different
with the membership of the Commission, which is generally much better balanced.
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bers). At the outset, it should be indicated that the ethnic representativeness re-
quirement should not be imposed on a country that has not “constitutionalized”
the indigenous question or does not have any important indigenous of commu-
nities of African descent. It should be imposed if they have. In fact, apart from
Chile, Argentina and Uruguay,55 persons of African descent (e.g., in Barbados,
Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, the United States, and Venezuela)
and indigenous communities are present in all other countries on the continent.
The more the expert committee is representative of the society, the more likely it
is to select, based on equal competence, women and members of ethnic minori-
ties. Here again, the Americas could lead the way. In Europe, this requirement
does not appear until a later stage, when the committee selects candidates and
at the international selection stage.
Based on the legal text of each state launching a call for candidacy—which
should provide some time for responses (three months should be enough)—
the committee members, having received the candidates’ CVs (which could be
“model CVs” drafted by the OAS as per the Council of Europe and which states
would use for their national selection procedure),56 would interview them. This
kind of individual interview already exists in European countries and provides
for a varied and effective assessment of candidates. When too many CVs have
been received (for all candidates to be interviewed), a short list could be estab-
lished. Only candidates who prima facie meet the following criteria and excel
would be interviewed: legal qualifications, human rights experience, and lan-
guage skills. Candidates should be proficient in Spanish as well as in English in
order to avoid—notably at the Inter-American Court—high fees for the transla-
tion of procedural documents. Ideally, the list of candidates who are considered
suitable to be appointed to a commissioner or judge position would be estab-
lished by consensus. In case of insurmountable divisions, voting could be a last
resort. Each representative from the judiciary, academia, the bar, NGOs, and
Ombudsmen would then have one vote, and the two or three candidate short
list,57 established by the independent expert committee, would be adopted by
a simple majority. It would also be appropriate for the committee to state the
reasons for its decisions. Stating the reasons for the choice of short-listed candi-
dates would help guarantee the “de-politicization” of the procedure to the best
extent possible.
The comparative analysis of European countries shows that the expert panels
do not have any binding power. They only give non-binding advisory opinions
to the executive power, whether it is the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, or the Presidency of the Republic, depending on national tradi-
tions. This is a relic of classical foreign affairs rules. This monopoly of executive
power should, in this particular field, cease. Once again, the Inter-American sys-
55 There are a few indigenous communities in Chile (Mapuches) and in Argentina, but they do
not represent an significant share of the population.
56 See infra Section III.A.2.
57 The list would comprise two candidates if no citizen from another OAS state party has been
shortlisted; otherwise the list would be composed of three candidates. SeeThe American Convention,
supra note 49.
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tem could encourage states to make the expert committee’s assessment legally
binding. Ideally, the expert committee would issue a verdict, which the govern-
ment would be legally bound to follow. In other words, the government would
only act as a communication channel between the committee, which effectively
shortlists the three candidates, and the General Assembly of the OAS.58
This practice would imply important changes. As a matter of fact, within the
Inter-American system, provisions of Article 53(2) of the American Convention
are purely discretionary: “Each of the States Parties may propose up to three
candidates,”59 whereas they are binding according to the European Conven-
tion: “The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with respect
to each High Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast from a list of three
candidates nominated by the High Contracting Party.”60 This mere option in the
Inter-American system should become a legally binding obligation61 so the later
selection procedure (i.e., at the international level) becomes an effective “filter”
resting on a real and effective assessment of candidates proposed by states.62
Setting up a transmission obligation of a list of two or three candidates (if can-
didates from third countries have been selected in the end), implementation of
this procedure could take two forms. The first is revising the American Conven-
tion according to Article 76.63 This is obviously the most complicated option,
not least because it would imply convincing the General Assembly to undertake
a revision process and getting the votes from two-thirds of states. It is also the
most dangerous political option because of the crisis that the Inter-American sys-
tem of human rights has been facing for several years. Amending the American
Convention could open “Pandora’s Box” and start a downward spiral, leading
to a worse position than the current one. Here, realism—a realistic approach—
must be considered. Another option would be to promote a custom that would
ultimately be followed due to encouragement from the General Assembly of the
OAS and high pressure from civil society, both within each state and in the Inter-
American system. It is obviously the most realistic and also the more suitable
remedy; permanent political pressure could work in the end.
58 Is this proposal too idealistic given the typical power of the executive? Possibly. The idea
here would be for the executive power to imperatively motivate any decision disregarding opinions
transmitted by the Panel so as to endorse responsibility for appointing a “bad” candidate.
59 The American Convention, supra note 49, art. 53(2) (emphasis added).
60 The European Convention, supra note 36, art. 22 (emphasis added).
61 This is all the more important as practice shows that, in fact, states present one candidate only.
62 See infra Part III.
63 The provision reads:
1. Proposals to amend this Convention may be submitted to the General Assem-
bly for the action it deems appropriate by any State Party directly, and by the
Commission or the Court through the Secretary General.
2. Amendments shall enter into force for the States ratifying them on the date
when two-thirds of the States Parties to the Convention have deposited their
respective instruments of ratification. With respect to the other State Parties,
the amendments shall enter into force on the dates on which they deposit their
respective instruments of ratification.
The American Convention, supra note 49, art. 76.
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III International Procedures to Assess Candidates
Assessing how we could strengthen the European processes for nominating
judges is relevant in order to make a comparative assessment in Part A, which
will then allow us to propose suitable options for the Inter-American system in
Part B.
A Comparative Assessment
In Europe, we can see a revealing trend whereby both supranational systems of
selection and nomination procedures are converging. As a matter of fact, faced
with many criticisms, the legal systems of the European Union (Section III.A.1)
and the European Convention (Section III.A.2), have improved the international
process for assessing candidates. The common element to both European proce-
dures is the establishment of an independent expert selection committee.
1 The European Union System (CJEU)
Before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1, 2009,64 members
of the Court of Justice and of the General Court were appointed by common
accord by the governments of the member states. The only requirement con-
cerned competencies of the chosen candidates. States were the only actors in
charge of the nominating procedures and of the choice of members of both these
courts. Inevitably, all that this selection method did was endorse nominations
that had been decided upon at the national level. Criteria were far from trans-
parent, often disputed, and sometimes political. Following the many criticisms
developed by legal doctrine, Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU)65 improved the procedure to nominate judges and
advocates-general so as to strengthen transparency. Under Article 255, a panel
was set up—the “255 Panel”—to give opinions on the suitability of candidates
proposed for appointment to the offices of judge and advocate-general.66
64 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
65 This provision states:
A panel shall be set up in order to give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform
the duties of Judge and Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the General
Court before the governments of the Member States make the appointments referred
to in Articles 253 and 254.
The panel shall comprise seven persons chosen from among former members of the
Court of Justice and the General Court, members of national supreme courts and
lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom shall be proposed by the European
Parliament. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the panel’s operating rules
and a decision appointing its members. It shall act on the initiative of the President of
the Court of Justice.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 255, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
66 Information on the functioning of the “255 Panel” was obtained through the reports
of the Panel—e.g., Third Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the
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Based on my analysis above,67 I will briefly present how the Panel is set up,
its membership, its functioning, and the scope of its decisions.68
The Council of the European Union, which is the body representing member
states’ governments, not only established the Panel’s operating rules,69 but also
appointed its members. These appointments were based on the initiative of the
President of the Court of Justice and the European Parliament, according to
Article 255(2) of the TFEU.70
The Panel is comprised of seven members, each appointed for four years.
Their term is renewable once. Six members are proposed by the serving Presi-
dent of the Court of Justice (Mr. Skouris) and one by the European Parliament.
The seven members are chosen from the former members of the Court of Justice
and the General Court,71 members of national supreme courts,72 and lawyers
of recognized competence, one of whom is proposed by the European Parlia-
ment.73 Some experts feared former EU judges’ “corporatism” since six mem-
bers were proposed by the serving President of the Court of Justice. However,
we observe that the highest national courts’ judges are well represented, for ex-
ample, when the EU Council appointed the Vice-President of the French Council
of State (Jean-Marc Sauvé), President of the Panel.74
To fulfill its duties, the Panel implements a procedure allowing for a thorough
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Dec. 13, 2013), http://curia.europa.
eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-02/rapport-c-255-en.pdf—as well as the ar-
ticles written by some of its members. See, e.g., Lord Mance, Justice of the Supreme Court of
the U.K., The Composition of the European Court of Justice (Oct. 19, 2011), http://ukael.
org/past_events_46_1935078262.pdf; Olivia Dufour, Les juges européens désormais nommés
après un avis d’un comité indépendant [European Judges are now Appointed after Consulta-
tions with an Independent Committee], Petites Affiches, Mar. 16, 2011, at 3, 7 (interview-
ing Jean-Marc Sauvé); Jean-Marc Sauvé, Qu’est-ce qu’un bon juge européen? [What Makes a
Good European Judge?], 187 Recueil Dalloz 1336 (2011); Jean-Marc Sauvé, President of
the 255 Panel, Intervention before the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
(May 30, 2013), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/content/download/3457/10399/version/1/
file/2013-05-30_audition-au-parlement-europeen.pdf; Jean-Marc Sauvé, La sélection des
juges de l’Union européenne: La pratique du Comité de l’article 255 [The Selection of Judges of
the European Union: The Practice of the 255 Panel], Intervention at the College of Europe Con-
ference: Selecting Europe’s Judges: A Critical Appraisal of Appointment Processes to the Euro-
pean Courts (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/content/download/3670/11038/
version/1/file/261113_selection_juges_union_europeenne.pdf [hereinafter Sauvé, The Se-
lection of Judges]. For an academic analysis, see Bo Vesterdorf, Editorial, La nomination des juges
à la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne [The Nomination of Judges to the European Court of
Justice], 47 Cahiers de droit européen [Eur. L. Rep.] 601, 601–08 (2011).
67 See supra Part II.
68 All of the following information comes from the 255 Panel’s annual reports and speeches by
some of its members (Lord Mance, Jean-Marc Sauvé). See sources cited supra note 66.
69 Council Decision 2010/124, 2010 O.J. (L 50) 18 (EU).
70 Id.
71 Peter Jann, former CJEU judge; Virpi Tiili, former Finnish judge of the General Court.
72 Lord Mance, Supreme Court of the U.K.; Torben Melchior, former President of the Supreme
Court of Denmark; Péter Paczolay, former President of the Constitutional Court of Hungary; Jean-
Marc Sauvé, Vice-President of the French Council of State.
73 Ana Palacio, Lawyer and Professor of Law, former member of the European Parliament and
member of the Spanish Council of State.
74 Council Decision 2010/124, supra note 69, art. 4.
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assessment of candidates. In particular, it benefits from an investigation power.
It requires governments to hand over information on the national selection pro-
cedure and to state the reasons for their proposal. Applications must contain,
apart from a curriculum vitae, a list of publications—in part or in full—and a
cover letter. The Panel does not rule out taking into account publicly available
and objective information, provided it allows for an adversarial debate with the
candidate and the state proposing the candidature. The key point of the investi-
gation carried out by the Panel is a hearing in private, the duration of which the
Panel decided should be one hour. It thus enables members to ask many ques-
tions. Under the Panel’s operating rules, such a hearing only takes place when
candidates are being assessed for a first term, not for a renewal. Apart from the
conditions in which candidates are assessed, the Panel, based on the TFEU provi-
sions, has also specified the assessment criteria. These two criteria—namely legal
expertise and professional experience, in particular with regard to level, dura-
tion, and diversity—allow the Panel to evaluate whether candidates are able to
pursue high or very high judicial duties or whether they can be regarded as jur-
isconsults of recognized competence under Article 253 of the TFEU. The Panel
also assesses candidates’ aptitudes for working in an environment in which a
number of legal traditions are represented. It pays particular attention to can-
didates’ ability to perform their duties with independence and impartiality. The
most critical aspect of the Panel’s functioning is the absence of publicity of its
opinions. In its first activity report, the Panel explained why neither its opinions
nor hearings could be made public. The Panel’s analysis of Regulations (EC)
No. 1049/2001 and (EC) No. 45/2001, as interpreted by the Court of Justice
of the European Union in its judgment of June 29, 2010, led it to judge that
the content of the opinions it gives, whether favorable or not, may not be made
public either directly or indirectly.75 However, Panel members explain that its
proceedings are transparent. In this regard, Jean-Marc Sauvé’s point of view can
be reproduced in extensor:
The Panel, however, through its activity reports, has decided to elab-
orate and publish public statements by its members, notably before
the European Parliament, which ensures a real transparency as to
what it does. It thus gives account of its process to investigate can-
didatures, detailed evaluation criteria it established and their con-
crete implementation and, finally, detailed statistics on its opinions,
be they favorable of not. Before arguing for greater transparency, it
seems to me that the current process should not be undermined—
for example by dissuading candidates whom, whilst not meeting all
criteria, such as the number of expected years of professional expe-
rience, could nevertheless be suitable. The principle of transparency
should be reconciled with the protection of candidates’ private life
and the full liberty of choice that Member States are given by the
Treaty: the publicity of hearings or opinions could, unnecessarily,
75 Case C-28/08, Comm’n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 E.C.R. I-6055.
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penalize candidates who were given an unfavorable opinion. For the
hearing is not a mere formality and the opinion given, whilst try-
ing to ensure respect due to candidates, does not hide the obvious
shortcomings of some candidates.76
The Panel gives advisory opinions only, which are non-binding. The Panel’s
opinions are forwarded to themember states, which remain competent to present
judges to the Court of Justice and appoint them. The President of the Panel con-
siders that, over time, the Panel’s opinions benefit from an increased “moral
value.” More importantly, according to him, the architecture of the nomination
process compensates for the fact that the Panel’s opinions are not legally bind-
ing. Since candidates are appointed by common accord,77 that is, unanimously,
opposition from only one state is enough to bar an appointment. As a conse-
quence, all states have to agree if they want to bypass an unfavorable opinion
given by the Panel. Such unanimity has never occurred to make a decision con-
trary to the Panel’s. As a matter of fact, when an unfavorable opinion has been
given, candidacies have been withdrawn by the states that presented them. In one
instance, the states’ meeting at an intergovernmental conference noted that con-
sensus was lacking over a candidate. This shows that, in fact, it is very difficult,
if not impossible, for states to oppose the Panel’s opinions.
2 The European Convention System (ECHR)
The European Convention system for selecting judges to the ECHR is similar to
the European Union. An independent Advisory Panel was also set up. However,
it is different since the Panel’s opinion is not forwarded to member states, but
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which then votes to
elect one of the three proposed candidates. Moreover, the Assembly’s choice goes
through an “internal control” procedure. A “sub-commission” is supposed to
make another assessment of the candidature’s credibility. We will see, however,
that practice shows that political considerations can prevail within the “sub-
commission” at the cost of candidates’ qualification.78
The first step is characterized by the intervention of the Advisory Panel of
Experts. One more time, based on my analysis above, I will briefly present how
the Advisory Panel is set up, its membership, functioning, and the scope of its
decisions.
76 Sauvé, The Selection of Judges, supra note 66 (my translation).
77 Article 253 of the TFEU states: “They shall be appointed by common accord of the govern-
ments of the Member States for a term of six years, after consultation of the panel provided for in
Article 255.” TFEU, supra note 65, art. 253.
78 Andrew Dremczewski, Election of Judges to the Strasbourg Court: An Overview, 2010 Eur.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 377, 380–82; Norbert P. Engel, More Transparency and Governmental Loyalty
for Maintaining Professional Quality in the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human
Rights, 32 Hum. Rts. L.J. 448, 448–55 (2012); Corneliu-Liviu Popescu, La cour européenne des
droits de l’homme [The European Court of Human Rights], in Indépendance et impartialité des
juges internationaux, supra note 4, at 39–135.
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The Panel was set up on Jean-Paul Costa’s initiative,79 in accordance with a
resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
November 10, 2010,80 with a view to assessing the relevance of the list of three
candidates presented by state parties before it is forwarded to the Parliamentary
Assembly. It was, among other elements, a consequence of Ukraine’s unaccept-
able political attitude in presenting a list of three inappropriate candidates.81
The seven member Panel was established on December 8, 2010. Its members
were chosen by the Committee of Ministers in agreement with the President of
the European Court as provided in the Committee of Ministers Resolution on
the Establishment of an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election
as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights.82
It is composed of the following representatives:83 members of the highest na-
tional courts,84 former judges of international courts, including the European
Court of Human Rights,85 and lawyers of recognized competence. It should be
noted that this last category was not filled. Only national judges and former in-
ternational judges found favor with the Committee of Ministers. It is also inter-
esting to observe that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution,86 there
was some geographic distribution (lawyers from Western and Eastern Europe)
as well as a gender-balanced representation (two women out of seven members).
79 French President of the European Court of Human Rights, Jean-Paul Costa, took this initia-
tive, closely following the Interlaken Declaration. He sent a letter to the Committee of Ministers
expressing his great concern: “The system will fail if judges do not have the necessary experience
and authority.” The Declaration adopted at the Interlaken Conference called on the state parties to
ensure the “full satisfaction of the Convention’s criteria for office as a judge of the Court, includ-
ing knowledge of public international law and the national legal systems as well as proficiency in
at least one official language.” High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, Interlaken Declaration, at 5 (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf. It should be noted that following the Interlaken
Declaration, the Committee of Ministers adopted Guidelines on the selection of candidates for the
post of judge at the European Court of Human Rights, which go further than the Interlaken Dec-
laration on the question of linguistic competence. See Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Guidelines of the
Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the Post of Judge at the European Court
of Human Rights, supra note 20 (“Candidates must, as an absolute minimum, be proficient in one
official language of the Council of Europe . . . and should also possess at least a passive knowledge
of the other”); Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selec-
tion of Candidates for the Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights—Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 21. This is in reference to Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1646, supra note 13, ¶ 4.4.
80 Eur. Comm. of Ministers Res. 26, On the establishment of an Advisory Panel of Experts
on Candidates for Election as Judge to the European Court of Human Right (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Res(2010)26.
81 For an explanation of the “Ukraine Case,” and other examples of very poor and disappointing
governmental attitudes (including France), see Engel, supra note 78, at 451.
82 Eur. Comm. of Ministers Res. 26, supra note 80, ¶ 3.
83 Id. ¶ 2.
84 Katarzyna Gonera, Supreme Court of Poland; Chief Justice John L. Murray, Supreme Court
of Ireland; Sami Selçuk, Professor and President of the Turkish Court of Appeal; Valery D. Zorkin,
President of the Constitutional Court of Russia.
85 Renate Jaeger, former German judge of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); Matti
Pellonpää, former Finnish judge of the ECHR; Lucius Wildhaber, former Swiss President of the
ECHR.
86 Eur. Comm. of Ministers Res. 26, supra note 80, ¶ 3.
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The Advisory Panel’s mandate is to confidentially advise the states whether
candidates for election as judge to the Court meet the criteria stipulated in Ar-
ticle 21 of the Convention: “The judges shall be of high moral character and
must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial
office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence.”87 The Advisory Panel re-
ceives the CVs of three candidates proposed by the states that have to propose
a new judge to the ECHR. The principle is that the Advisory Panel carries out a
written investigation. Apart from the CVs, the Panel also resorts to its network
(mostly judges) to get a clearer view of candidates’ profiles. If deemed necessary,
it may also organize hearings. Although the Advisory Panel suggested early in
its existence that it might publish an annual report to the Committee of Min-
isters on its activities, it has so far not done so. The activities of the Advisory
Panel, however, have twice been discussed during exchanges between the Chair
of the Panel and the Ministers’ Deputies.88 In addition, there have been informal
meetings between the Chair of the Panel and representatives of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly, such as the Chairperson of the Sub-committee on the Election of
Judges, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, and the Secretary General
of the Parliamentary Assembly.89
If the list of three candidates does not cause any problems in terms of quality,
the Panel informs the state. The state then forwards its list to the Parliamentary
Assembly. On the other hand, when one or more names on the list present diffi-
culties, the Panel asks the state for more information; herein lies its raison d’être:
give the state an opinion that must remain confidential. It is a bilateral and confi-
dential dialogue. If, after discussion with the state, the Panel is still not convinced
of the candidate’s quality, it can reject them. The Panel informs the state, which
must then present a new list of three candidates.
Here is a more detailed overview of the procedure with a time-line:
The members shall give their opinion on a list of candidates within
five working days following the receipt of the list from its Secre-
tariat. This should ensure that there is sufficient time to request ad-
ditional information from the government concerned, if necessary.
Within four weeks after the State Party submits the names of the
proposed candidates and their curricula vitae (using the model CV
form as supplied by the Parliamentary Assembly), the Government is
informed of the views of the Advisory Panel. Given the fact that the
87 The European Convention, supra note 60, art. 22.
88 This took place on April 4, 2012 and January 30, 2013. Comm. of Experts on
the Reform of the Court [DH-GDR], Ministers’ Deputies Exchange of Views with Mr.
Luzius Wildhaber, Chairman of the Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Elec-
tion as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights, CDDH Doc. DH-GDR(2013)005
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/DH_GDR/DH-
GDR(2013)005_Exchange_views_Wildhaber.pdf.
89 Steering Comm. for Human Rights [CDDH], Rep. on the Review of the Functioning of the
Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the European Court of Human
Rights, ¶ 27, Doc. No. CDDH(2013)R79, add. 2 (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/cddh/CDDH-DOCUMENTS/CDDH(2013)R79_Addendum%20II_EN.pdf [hereinafter
The CDDH Report].
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governments are requested to provide the necessary information to
the Advisory Panel six weeks before the time-limit set by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly for submission of the national list of candidates,
this then leaves only two weeks to present a new candidate in case
the Advisory Panel expresses doubts as to the qualifications of any
of the candidates. Before the State Party submits the list to the As-
sembly, the newly proposed candidates’ qualifications should also be
assessed by the Advisory Panel.90
A report by the Steering Committee of Human Rights of the Council of Eu-
rope of November 29, 2013 points out some of the shortcomings of this proce-
dure and makes proposals for improvement.91 First, the opinions are not always
followed.92 This was the case when the Czech government obtained, thanks to a
very aggressive policy, the election of “its” candidate who was the legal adviser
to the Czech President, Vaclav Klaus. As Engel stressed:
When a Government—like the Czech Government in the Pejchal
case—ignores the negative opinion of the Evaluation Panel set up
to ensure the quality of the judges elected and when it subsequently
pushes through the rejected candidate in the plenary session of the
Assembly Sub-Committee competent tomake an election recommen-
dation—that is not a sign of good faith cooperation. On the contrary,
it reveals a systemic dysfunction that undermines the Court’s stabil-
ity and authority.93
In this worrisome context, the Steering Committee proposes the following:
“While the opinion of the Advisory Panel is non-binding, it may be assumed that
the Sub-Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly gives due consideration to an
opinion of the Advisory Panel on a particular list of candidates.”94 The Assem-
bly should understand that the Advisory Panel is not a competitor, but a helpful
body aimed at introducing political confidence, based on an objective expertise,
in the appointment process. It should be noted, however, that there is at least
one counter example with regard to France: The process to name a successor
to the French judge Jean-Paul Costa (who was President of the European Court
of Human Rights) in 2010 was tainted by political maneuver that proved disas-
trous for France’s image. Nicolas Sarkozy’s government presented a list of three
90 Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
91 See id.
92 As noted by the CDDH:
Although neither is the government concerned required to follow the Advisory Panel’s
advice, nor is the Parliamentary Assembly required to act consistently with it, it was
noted that there was an instance in 2012 when despite the Advisory Panel’s view that
a candidate was not qualified, the Government concerned maintained that person
on the list of candidates and the Parliamentary Assembly subsequently elected that
person to the Court.
Id. ¶ 30.
93 Engel, supra note 78, at 450.
94 The CDDH Report, supra note 89, ¶ 32.
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candidates, one of whom clearly did not have the required qualifications. The
expert Panel’s control proved efficient since France did not hesitate to come up
with a new, more credible, list. It should be recalled that this process appeared
in the press and it damaged France’s reputation in the Human Rights Palace in
Strasbourg! The CDDH Report, combined with the French experience, shows
that states’ “bona fides” vary. The Panel’s unfavorable opinion was an affront
to France, which swiftly presented a new list. Other states do not have the same
foreign policy in terms of legal affairs and the same idea of “standing” or a legal
and political reputation to be maintained. The second shortcoming is that some
states do not wait for the Panel to give its opinion and directly forward their
list to the Parliamentary Assembly.95 In the Steering Committee’s view, this is
unacceptable:
The CDDH considers such practices by States Parties to be incom-
patible with the raison d’être of CM Resolution (2010) 26. States
Parties are reminded of the need to submit lists of candidates well
before the deadline by which they must submit their list to the Par-
liamentary Assembly. Likewise, the Parliamentary Assembly is in-
vited not to proceed with the election process without allowing the
Advisory Panel a reasonable time within which to inform the State
Party concerned of its views on the intended candidates. Where a list
of candidates has already been transmitted to the Parliamentary As-
sembly, the Advisory Panel should simultaneously transmit its views
to the latter.96
The third and last shortcoming concerns the original operating rules: The
Advisory Panel indicated that it found them too restrictive, e.g., with respect to
the holding of meetings and the use of information from sources other than the
government. In its view, this warrants a re-evaluation of the operating rules in
place.97
95 The CDDH Report states:
There have been instances in which State Parties have submitted lists of candidates
to the Parliamentary Assembly and the Advisory Panel simultaneously, or only to the
Parliamentary Assembly, without awaiting the Advisory Panel’s opinion and despite
the Advisory Panel having requested additional time for examination of the curricula
vitae concerned. In two instances, the Advisory Panel requested the Parliamentary
Assembly not to proceed with the election process before it had been able to issue an
opinion.
Id. ¶ 33.
96 Id. ¶ 34.
97 The CDDH Report notes:
In the Operating Rules, a primarily written procedure is foreseen. The Advisory Panel
can decide to hold a meeting “where it deems this necessary to the performance of its
function.” In practice, seven meetings of the Advisory Panel were convened between
January 2011 and October 2013 which seems to suggest that meetings have become
the rule and not the exception. The Advisory Panel suggests making meetings the
norm, considering that a purely written procedure does not allow for a meaningful
discussion based on direct exchange of views.
Id. ¶ 41 (citation omitted).
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The second phase of the procedure is the intervention of the Sub-Committee
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary As-
sembly.
Article 22 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that: “The
judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each High
Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast from a list of three candidates
nominated by the High Contracting Party.”98 National authorities must there-
fore forward their list directly to the Assembly. In order to fulfill its mandate
in the most effective way possible the Assembly created a Sub-Committee on
the Election of Judges to the ECHR in 1997. The appendix to Resolution 1432
(2005)99 provides that the list of candidates for the election of judges, once sub-
mitted to the Parliamentary Assembly, should not be modified. The Assembly
shall interrupt the procedure if one of the three candidates on a list withdraws
before the first ballot. In such cases, it shall ask the government concerned to
recomplete the list of candidates. The Assembly confirms its practice of listing
candidates in alphabetical order on the ballot paper. It also underlines that any
expression of governmental preference shall play no role in the deliberations of
the Sub-Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human
Rights. The Sub-Committee hears the candidates (transport and accommodation
expenses are provided for in the budget of the Council of Europe). The relevant
criteria are the following: language skills and gender equality.
Regarding language skills, candidates must have a sufficient knowledge of
at least one of the two official languages, English or French. When a candi-
date, who is otherwise considered suitable for the office of judge, does not have
the required level of language skills at the date of the election, some members
have proposed that the candidate could commit to taking an intensive course
before taking office or, exceptionally, at the beginning of his or her term. With
regard to the gender balance, in 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly took a new
measure in terms of positive action. It decided to consider lists of three candi-
dates on the condition they would contain at least one member of each sex. It
went even further by inviting the Committee of Ministers to amend Article 22
to take this requirement into account.100 Nevertheless, some states, and notably
the smallest ones, have underlined that in rare cases, where there is only a limited
number of qualified women, meeting this criteria was complicated. Therefore,
should the Convention be amended, they could not comply with it. Following a
dispute with Malta, which twice presented only male candidates to replace the
Maltese judge Giovanni Bonello, the Committee of Ministers requested the Eu-
ropean Court’s opinion. The Court itself declared that although the Assembly’s
approach relating to the promotion of gender equality was sensible, its automatic
implementation, without any exception, did not comply with Article 21 of the
98 The European Convention, supra note 60, art. 22.
99 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1432, Procedure for Elections Held by the Parliamentary Assembly other
than those of its President and Vice-Presidents (2005), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17316.
100 Eur. Parl. Ass. Recommendation 1649, supra note 13.
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Convention.101 Following the Court’s Advisory Opinion and two heated debates
within the Assembly, it decided to promulgate Resolution 1627 of September 30,
2008, which would allow exceptions to this rule, but only once the concerned
state party has demonstrated that it tried in vain to find a qualified candidate of
the under-represented sex.102
B Proposals for the Inter-American System
The experience of both European systems in terms of selection of candidates to
the office of judge demonstrates two things. First, that it is extremely difficult
to achieve a system beyond reproach. Second, and most importantly, that the
Council of Europe system which, a priori, could be considered to be the most
sophisticated in practice, is revealed to have important shortcomings. Based on
the European experience in terms of selection procedures, I have decided to give
some food for thought below, taking into account the downward slide observed
in the European practices to help prevent any recurrence in the Inter-American
system.
The first important good governance rule would be the creation of an inde-
pendent Advisory Panel within the OAS. In my opinion, the power to set up the
Advisory Panel should lie with the General Assembly of the OAS. In the Euro-
pean systems, the Advisory Panels were established by both intergovernmental
bodies, representing states at the ministerial level. This “intergovernmental” el-
ement cannot be erased. It would not be realistic to dramatically change things
at this stage. One could imagine that, in order to perform this duty, the General
Assembly would be supported by the Inter-American Juridical Committee (IAJC)
in accordance with Article 99.103 The criteria regarding the composition of this
Panel may also be borrowed from the European experience. Both European Ad-
visory Panels are comprised of seven members. This number has given full sat-
isfaction to date. This would probably also be the case in the Inter-American
system. The General Assembly of the OAS must be bound, when establishing
membership of the Panel, to take into account representation of different legal
cultures, different geographic areas, differences in terms of gender, and, last but
not least, for the American continent, ethnic differences. The more representa-
tive the Panel is, the more legitimate and able it will be to be especially sensitive
to candidatures—of equal competence—from women and ethnic minorities.
The seven members would be appointed by the General Assembly for a four-
year term renewable once, by the General Assembly (in order to allow customs
to be established in terms of the assessment and selection of candidates). Eu-
101 On Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates Submitted with a View to
the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Feb. 12, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-2268009-2419060.
102 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1627, Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights (2008),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17670.
103 “The purpose of the Inter-American Juridical Committee is to serve the Organization as an ad-
visory body on juridical matters,” and “[t]he Inter-American Juridical Committee shall undertake the
studies and preparatory work assigned to it by the General Assembly.” Charter of the Organization
of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416, 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
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ropean criteria to choose the members of the Panel could be maintained and
completed by another, which is essential in the Inter-American context: the role
of civil society. Likewise, it would be good to provide a rule setting precisely
the number of experts by origin so as to avoid a status being over-represented,
whilst giving a small preference to former members of the Inter-American Court
and Commission, given their experience. The Advisory Panel could thus be com-
posed of two members of the highest national courts;104 three former judges of
the Inter-American Court (for the office of judge) or three former members of
the Inter-American Commission (for the office of commissioner); and two rep-
resentatives of the civil society.105 Practice shows that the inquiry procedure
cannot be a written one only. Hearings must be mandatory as they have been
proven essential to the concrete and effective understanding of candidates’ qual-
ifications. Hearings and related expenses would be taken into account by the
General Assembly of the OAS. Candidates should send a model CV similar to
the one drafted by the General Assembly of the Council so that there are as many
comparable elements as possible. When the Panel members do not agree on the
list presented by a state—because they consider it to be particularly weak—the
Panel could ask the state to propose another one within a set time frame (one
month for example). If not, the Panel could determine that the state has re-
nounced presenting candidates. It is also important to make publication of an
annual report compulsory. This would guarantee that the selection process is
transparent and would enhance the Panel’s legitimacy. In this respect, it is very
interesting to note the different practices of both European Panels. Reports by
the “255 Panel” as well as public statements by its members have contributed
to making its assessment work transparent; it has established legitimacy grad-
ually, whilst managing to protect candidates’ private lives (notably for those
who were rejected). On the other hand, the fact that the Advisory Panel of the
Council of Europe has never published an annual report has proven frustrating
for its members and contributed to its activities being very confidential—a neg-
ative. In its annual report, the Panel would present the number of candidates,
the number of women and ethnic representatives, candidates’ profiles (judges,
lawyers, professors), and the criteria taken into account to select them. At this
stage, the important question is: What would the Inter-American Advisory Panel
make decisions on?
Practice in the European Union shows that non-legally binding opinions,
which at first appeared as a weakness, have actually become legally binding ones
because EU member states take the moral value of the Panel’s opinion very seri-
ously. Since the opinion given concerns all candidates, states can only reject the
Advisory Panel’s point of view unanimously, which has never happened. Practice
in the Council of Europe—which a priori is seen as more democratic—has had
the negative effects observed above. The Panel’s expertise is not systematically
104 These “highest national courts” are those of the states who have recognized the competence
of the Court to provide candidates to the office of judge; on the other hand, regarding assessment of
candidates to the office of commissioner, the “highest national courts” are those of all OAS member
states.
105 They could be chosen from NGOs recognized by the OAS.
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taken seriously by some states. Besides, “internal democracy” within the Coun-
cil of Europe has meant that political bargaining at the election stage could not
only bypass the Advisory Panel’s opinion, but could also circumvent the opin-
ion of the Sub-Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly. In short, democracy
has run counter to competence several times. In the Inter-American system, the
question of the competence of members of the Court and the Commission is not
so central.106 As a matter of fact, it is easier to reach excellence when electing
“only” seven judges and seven commissioners as opposed to twenty-eight judges
(CJEU) or, even worse, forty-seven (ECHR)! Consequently, what matters most
for the Inter-American System is the transparency of the procedure that must
rely on the objectivity of candidate assessment. This will, in turn, protect the
credibility of these two bodies’ members.
A first option would be to grant the Advisory Panel decision-making power
to help promote competence. The power of election, which currently sits with
the General Assembly of the OAS, should be eradicated because it generates the
classic problem of vote trading. This solution would also give a better chance to
excellent candidates from small countries,107 and avoid politically or economi-
cally powerful states winning more easily the election of one of their nationals to
the Commission or the Court.108 Therefore, decision-making power would lie
with the Panel. This new feature would be even easier to accept, as members of
the Panel would be selected by the General Assembly of the OAS, together with
the IAJC. A certain power would thus be granted to states ahead of the process;
however, subsequently, they should accept the choice of the experts and endorse
it. This dramatic change is the only one that can prevent any political bargaining
in the election (be it the election by states (OAS) or by peoples’ representatives
(as shown with the experience of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe). In the end, political bargaining damages elected members.109 For states
106 Although a number of NGOs as important as the CEJIL have stated the contrary, and despite
the history of the Inter-American System, it has been noted that some candidates did not entirely
possess all the required qualifications; we think that the existence of “isolated cases” cannot be
compared to the underlying problem that has greatly destabilized the European system, to the point
where the European Court’s “legitimacy” was undermined. See Ctr. for Justice & Int’l Law,
Aportes para el proceso de selección de miembros de la Comisión y la Corte Interamer-
icanas de Derechos Humanos [Contributions to the Process of Selection of Members
of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights] 9 (2005); see also supra
Part II.
107 Similarly, it is revealing that some countries have never had any judges elected to the Court
(such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Paraguay), whereas Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela,
Chile, and Mexico have had judges from their country elected several times.
108 As of 2014, Mexico had three important representatives in the Inter-American System (the
President of the Commission, the Executive Secretary of the Commission, and a judge of the Court).
This demonstrates a degree of political power of a country that managed to have three personalities
of unquestioned competence elected. Thankfully, it can be considered positively as Mexico’s foreign
policy in terms of legal affairs is characterized by the promotion of excellence with regard to inter-
national nominations and defense of the Inter-American System. See Ctr. for Justice & Int’l Law,
supra note 106, at 19. However, one can imagine the devastating effect if a country promoting a
more questionable policy got the same results.
109 It is obvious that we are rather “radical.” While many authors have denounced the “politi-
cization” of the election process for the offices of judge and commissioner, none went as far as
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to accept this rule, we could imagine a “safeguard clause,” stating that only state
unanimity could overthrow the Panel’s choice.
This kind of proposal is probably the boldest but, at the same time, the least
realistic given the continued power of sovereignty in international law. States
nowadays would never accept such a dispossession of their political power,
especially in the current Latin American context. A second solution is much
more realistic. If, one day, the creation of the Panel is a success, it would cer-
tainly be more suitable to leave the final decision in the hands of the states (i.e.,
through the General Assembly of the OAS). They will be accountable for their
final choice. But at this stage, the creation of an Inter-American Panel has not
yet been discussed within the OAS bodies.
So, for now, a very fruitful and easy to implement idea would be to use
the new public appointment process for the commissioners agreed to in 2013
before the Permanent Council for the appointment of judges.110 Some actors
agreed that the hearing was very positive and instructive.111 The best candidates
were clearly and quickly identified. This kind of new custom is part of the good
governance rules. It would be important that the same kind of scrutiny existed
for candidates for a position in the Inter-American Court: a hearing before the
Permanent Council, followed by the election by the General Assembly.
The second important good governance rule would be to take into account
some material criteria for selecting candidates. This rule is completely indepen-
dent of the existence of an Inter-American Advisory Panel within the OAS. In
other words, although its creation is still a mere proposal, the criteria presented
below can be used either by the General Assembly or the Permanent Council if
the custom of hearings becomes stronger.
The specific competence of the candidates in the human rights field could
be scrutinized. Analysis of the profile of former judges of the Inter-American
Court demonstrates that this requirement has not been taken into consideration
systematically. In other words, the main question in the Americas—as opposed
to Europe—does not lie specifically within the candidates’ qualifications as such,
but rather, their orientation. I believe the competence of Inter-American judges is
remarkable in many ways.112 On the other hand, a study of their profile shows
that they did not all have a human rights background. Yet, it is legitimate to
proposing to get rid of the election system. See Faúndez Ledesma, supra note 7; Judith Schönsteiner,
supra note 7; Ruiz-Chiriboga, supra note 7.
110 See O.A.S. Secretary of the Permanent Council, Letter dated Apr. 22, 2013 from the
Secretary of the Permanent Council to the Representatives of the Permanent Council, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.G./CP/INF.6711/13, at 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/
civil_society/docs/050113/ob_en.pdf (stating the second order of business was “Forum of
candidates to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”).
111 These actors include, members of the diplomatic corps (like theMexican and Jamaican Ambas-
sadors before the OAS, Joël Antonio Hernandez Garcia and Stephen Vasciannie) as well as represen-
tatives of NGOs like Viviane Krsticevic (Executive Director of CEJIL), and Katya Salazar (Executive
Director of the Due Process of Law Foundation). They all seriously considered the hearing of candi-
dates for positions to the Inter-American Commission held on Wednesday May 1, 2013 at a Regular
Meeting on the Permanent Council.
112 Perhaps this point of view cannot be easily presented to the Commissioners.
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strengthen this requirement’s effectiveness, as mentioned in the Statutes,113 for
positions at the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights.
The rules on the incompatibility of functions should be carefully scrutinized
by the Panel in the Inter-American Convention,114 the Statute of the Court for
judges,115 and Article 4 of the Rules of Procedures of the Commission.116 As
judges and commissioners do not work full time, very strict rules on incom-
patibility will have to be put in place ahead of the process to make sure that
the candidates’ functions in their own countries are absolutely compatible with
those they would have in the Inter-American system. The exception provided for
in Article 18(1) of the Statute of the Court relating to the office of judge should
be interpreted as strictly as possible—not to say ruled out.117 Apart from the
real problems that arise in terms of independence from holding a position in the
executive branch of government, even if there is no direct control by the exec-
utive, or in a diplomatic mission, it is the image and therefore the legitimacy of
the Court that is ultimately at risk.
113 O.A.S. G.A. Res. 448 (IX), Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 4(1)
(Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter Statute of the Court]; O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX), Statute of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, art. 2(1) (Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter Statute of the Com-
mission] (“The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights shall be composed of seven mem-
bers, who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human
rights.”).
114 “The position of judge of the Court or member of the Commission is incompatible with any
other activity that might affect the independence or impartiality of such judge or member, as deter-
mined in the respective statutes.” The American Convention, supra note 49, art. 71.
115 Statute of the Court, supra note 113, art. 18:
1. The position of judge of the Inter‐American Court of Human Rights is incom-
patible with the following positions and activities:
a. Members or high‐ranking officials of the executive branch of government,
except for those who hold positions that do not place them under the
direct control of the executive branch and those of diplomatic agents who
are not Chiefs of Missions to the OAS or to any of its member states;
b. Officials of international organizations;
c. Any others that might prevent the judges from discharging their duties,
or that might affect their independence or impartiality, or the dignity and
prestige of the office.
Id. (emphasis added).
116 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Res. 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, Policies and Practices, art. 4(1) (Mar. 18, 2013), reprinted in Inter-Am. Commission
on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/RulesIACHR2013.pdf (last visited June 25,
2015) [hereinafter Rules of the Commission].
The position of member of the Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights is in-
compatible with the exercise of activities which could affect the independence or im-
partiality of the member, or the dignity or prestige of the office. Upon taking office,
members shall undertake not to represent victims or their relatives, or States, in pre-
cautionary measures, petitions and individual cases before the IACHR for a period of
two years, counted from the date of the end of their term as members of the Commis-
sion.
Id.
117 Statute of the Court, supra note 113.
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The language skills could be strictly controlled. This aspect has become cru-
cial in Europe. In a bilingual Court like the ECHR, it is absolutely necessary to
possess an active knowledge of one official language of the Council of Europe
and a passive knowledge of the other (i.e., enough to understand nuances of
complex legal documents). This point is also important in the Inter-American
context. It is utterly crucial, if not fundamental, to the office of commissioner
(given the location of headquarters and its remit). This is also the case for the
Court. First of all, it would be a way of further ensuring unity between Anglo-
Saxon and Latin worlds, thus reinforcing a “common” approach to legal cul-
tures and interpretation of rights.118 Second, and more pragmatically, it would
guarantee that in the future, if a judge came from an Anglo-Saxon country, costly
translation of debates and procedural documents would not be required. If a can-
didate, otherwise fully qualified to pursue the duties of judge, does not possess
the necessary language skills at the date of election, the Inter-American Advisory
Panel—or the Permanent Council, or the General Assembly—could require that
at the hearing, they make a firm commitment to take an intensive course before
taking office or, exceptionally, at the beginning of their term.
Last but not least, representativeness in terms of gender equality and ethnic
minority representatives could bemuch improved. This is a major issue. It should
be on the agenda of the General Assembly of the OAS and of the main civil so-
ciety organizations in Latin America over the next few years. Presentation of
female candidates and of ethnic minorities should be strongly encouraged, espe-
cially in countries where the “indigenous issue” has been “constitutionalized.” If
the composition of the Commission has been quite representative over the years,
the composition of the Court is clearly unacceptable. In thirty-five years, out of
thirty-five judges, only four have been women.119 There are none on the current
Court. In 2015, such a state of affairs is outrageous. The idea is not to promote
women or ethnic minority representatives with profiles not as good as men. The
idea is to encourage qualified women and ethnic minority representatives. I find
it hard to believe that “big” countries, in political and economic terms, could
not find female candidates or ethnic minorities with strong competence.120 On
the other hand, we can imagine that in “small” countries it can be hard—as it
118 On the “Anglo-Latin Divide” question, see Paolo G. Carozza, Essay, The Anglo-Latin Divide
and the Future of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 5 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L.
153 (2015).
119 Women former judges have included Cecilia Medina Quiroga (2004–2009, Chile), Sonia Pi-
cado Sotela (1988–1994, Costa Rica), Rhadys Iris Abreu Blondet (2007–2012, Dominican Repub-
lic), and Margaret May Macaulay (2007–2012, Jamaica). J. Mo Pasqualucci has painted a very
interesting portrait of Sonia Picado. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Sonia Picado, First Woman Judge on the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 Hum. Rts. Q. 794 (1995). Cecilia Medina Quiroga’s
academic work has been impressive. See, e.g., Cecilia Medina Quiroga, The Battle of Hu-
man Rights, Gross Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System 363 (1988); Ce-
cilia Medina Quiroga, La Convención americana: vida, integridad personal, libertad
personal, debido proceso y recurso judicial [The American Convention: Life, Personal
Integrity, Perosnal Liberty, Due Process, and Judicial Recourse] 428 (2005).
120 It is hard to realize that even if a feminist approach to international law has created a lot of
inventive legal literature, normative change is still very slow. See Hilary Charlesworth, Sexe,
genre et droit international [Sex, Gender, and International Law] (2013).
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has been in Malta—to draw up lists including women and minority represen-
tatives. In such cases, the state will have to demonstrate that it has complied,
in the national selection procedure, with all the requirements listed in Part II of
this Article, in order to encourage female and ethnic candidates. The potential
absence of a woman or a minority representative should be exceptional.121
IV Concluding Remarks
This Article has tried to explore only one of the numerous factors that have an
impact on the independence of both bodies of the Inter-American human rights
system. I would like to conclude by examining the question of tenure and reap-
pointment. While the issue of the term of office for judges and commissioners is
not strictly part of the questions relating to their selection and election process,
it should be mentioned that their independence would be much better protected
if the term was longer and non-renewable. Yet, today, judges are elected for six
years and can be reelected only once,122 while commissioners are elected for four
years and can also only be reelected once.123 It would be preferable to have their
term coincide with judges by making it longer but non-renewable. The Euro-
pean experience is key. The Council of Europe, having tried several solutions
and realizing the very serious negative aspects of renewable terms, has opted in
Protocol No. 14 for a non-renewable term of nine years.124 This step was unan-
imously welcomed by practitioners such as lawyers and NGOs, representatives
of academia, and, last but not least, the judges themselves.125 In this context, we
could imagine a similar non-renewable term of office of eight or nine years for
judges and commissioners. Jurisprudential coherence and continuity would be
ensured, as well as the independence of members of the Commission and Court
who could, without any difficulty, implement the famous “duty of ingratitude”
towards their country of origin.
Within the Latin American context, this is an idealistic proposal. First, it
would require revision of the American Convention—at least for the tenure of
the judges—and, as we have seen, it is not currently realistic or appropriate.
121 The ECHR, the International Criminal Court, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights have non-legally binding rules aimed to encourage a fair representation of genders amongst
their members.
122 “The judges of the Court shall be elected for a term of six years and may be reelected only
once.” The American Convention, supra note 49, art. 54(1).
123 “The members of the Commission shall be elected for a term of four years and may be reelected
only once. Their terms of office shall begin on January 1 of the year following the year in which they
are elected.” The Statute of the Court, supra note 113, art. 6; see also Statute of the Commission,
supra note 113.
124 “The judges’ terms of office have been changed and increased to nine years. Judges may not,
however, be re-elected. These changes are intended to reinforce their independence and impartiality,
as desired notably by the Parliamentary Assembly in its Recommendation 1649 (2004).” Council of
Europe, Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention: Explanatory Report, ¶ 50 (May 13,
2004), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm.
125 Popescu, supra note 78, at 83.
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Nonetheless, it is something important to keep in mind for the long run, when
the crisis of the Inter-American human rights system will become an old story.
